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Abstract— In the past few years, computer worms are seen as one of significant challenges of cloud 
computing. Worms are rapidly changing and getting more sophisticated to evade detection. One major issue 
to defend against computer worms is collecting worms’ payloads to generate their signature and study their 
behavior. To collect worms’ payloads, we identified challenges for detecting and collecting worms’ payloads 
and proposed high-interactive honeypot to collect payloads of zero-day polymorphic worms in homogeneous 
and heterogeneous cloud computing platforms. Virtual machine (VM) memory and VM disk image are 
inspected from outside using open-source forensics tools and VMWare Virtual Disk Development Kit. Our 
experiments show that the proposed approach overcomes the identified challenges. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Rapid growth of the demand for computational outsourcing has led to the creation of large-scale cloud 
computing data centers. Organizations outsource their computational needs to cloud data centers instead of 
incurring high upfront costs in purchasing IT infrastructure, and dealing with maintenance and upgrades of both 
software and hardware [2]. Cloud computing data centers leverage virtualization technology to allow creation of 
multiple Virtual Machine (VM) instances on a single physical server and allow creation of multiple virtual 
networks (VN) on a single physical network [1].  
Cloud computing networks contain thousands of VMs. Such networks are susceptible to attack from attackers 
and malware programs, so that the cloud providers have to take pre-emptive steps to ensure security in their 
cloud networks. Computer worms are the most danger malware computer programs that harm cloud networks [4, 
15]. Worms can be used to perform many malicious activities (e.g., steal information, launch-flooding attacks 
against servers, etc.) [14]. Worms’ writers try to make their worms undetectable as long as possible to infect 
many more hosts. In another side, cloud providers try to minimize worms’ life and spreading in their cloud 
networks. 
 Using virtualization software (e.g., VMWare, Xen, and KVM), all components in the real physical networks 
can be virtualized, and spreading of worms can be minimized by isolating the traffic of each virtual network 
from the traffic of other networks. The traffic is isolated even if their VMs are on the same physical server and 
their virtual interfaces transmit traffic across the same underlying NIC [6]. Any VM outside of the virtual 
network cannot sniff or inject traffic into the virtual network [6]. However, VMs are still susceptible to attack 
from worms running in VMs in the same virtual network. 
Detecting and collecting worms’ payloads are very significant processes in defending against unknown 
worms. Collected payloads can be used to generate worms’ signatures and to study their malicious activities. In 
this paper, we identified a set of challenges for detecting and collecting worms’ payloads. Additionally, we 
proposed an approach to detect and collect payloads of unknown and self-replicated polymorphic worms in 
homogeneous and heterogeneous cloud computing platforms. The proposed approach attaches honeypots with 
the inspected virtual networks to get the payload of the running worms. Different polymorphic worm instances 
are collected using double honeypot. Honeypots’ VMs are inspected in hypervisor layer using open-source 
forensic tools together with virtual disk image management tools. Finally, we evaluated the proposed approach 
based on the previously defined challenges.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives some background of computer worms. Section 3 gives a 
short overview of related works. Section 4 presents our approach and illustrates the design and implementation 
of the proposed approach. The proposed approach is evaluated in section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
II. COMPUTER WORMS  
A worm is a self-replicated malware computer program, which propagated over the network with or without 
human intervention. Worms send copies of their code to victim machines and gain control of the execution of 
remote programs to execute their code in remote machines. Worms gain control of a program’s execution by 
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injecting new code into the program, injecting new control-flow edges into the program, or corrupting data used 
by the program [14]. 
The most popular techniques to detect computer worms can be categorized into two major categories [15], [7]: 
anomaly-based detection and signature-based detection. Anomaly-based detection techniques use the knowledge 
of what is considered as a normal behavior to identify computer worms. Although, anomaly-based detection is 
able to detect new and unknown computer worms, it reduces the network speed by checking every packet and 
reduces the computer performance by monitoring all activities.  
Signature-based detection techniques detect known computer worms from other programs by comparing them 
against signatures of known computer worms. A signature is a pattern generated using instances of known 
computer worm to identify it. However, signature-based detection cannot detect new computer worms and 
maintaining signature database is not easy task [15]. 
Detection of computer worms can be improved by combining techniques from both categories. For example, 
a signature-based detection technique can be used to filter know computer worms and an anomaly-based 
detection technique can be used to detect unknown computer worms and collect their payloads. Collected 
payloads are forwarded to a signature generator, which generates signatures. Based on the generated signatures, 
signature-based detector will detect these worms in the future. By inspecting the behavior of the collected 
payloads, we can gain sufficient knowledge about their malicious activities, which will help in decontaminating 
infected VMs. 
Worms use different techniques to be hidden and undetectable. For Example, to avoid detection by analyzing 
network traffic patterns, Worms blend their attack traffic within normal traffic. To avoid detection by 
monitoring the running processes and the loaded modules, worms attach themselves with trusted processes and 
modules. To avoid detection by monitoring the scanned IP addresses, worms collect addresses in infected 
computers to find new victims instead of scanning complete IP address space. To circumvent detection by 
monitoring changes in file system, worms may remain in memory for a period of time and perform some 
malicious activities, such as opening a back door on the host or sending the confidential information on the host 
to the worms’ writers before modifying the file system [19]. To evade detection by memory scanners that scan 
the inspected memory linearly, worms move their memory structures to a region that has already been scanned 
[19]. 
To evade detection by detectors, worms try to identify if the remote system is a detector before sending their 
code and try to infer if they are running inside detection environment before starting their malicious actions. 
Worms can identify detectors remotely by analyzing its responses to network messages and identify detectors 
locally by monitoring their behavior.   
To avoid detection by anomaly-based detectors, worms can try to be smooth and silent by performing small 
amounts of malicious activities and avoid loud activities (e.g., consuming the computer resources, sending a 
large number of Emails, establishing a large number of network connections, etc.).  
To avoid detection by signature-based detectors, worms use polymorphism. Polymorphic worms change their 
payloads in every infection using encryption and code obfuscation. This change makes it difficult to generate 
signatures for these worms. Generating signature for a polymorphic worm requires collecting a large number of 
payload’s instances and identifying the common byte strings in these payloads to be used as a worm signature. 
However, polymorphic worms can change their payload completely, which make it impossible to generate 
signatures [14]. Furthermore, polymorphic worms can avoid payloads’ collectors (e.g., double-honeynet systems) 
by checking if the worm is already running on the remote system before sending their code.  
Another technique to evade detection by signature-based detectors is designing worms as a set of components. 
Each standalone component is not harmful by itself and can stay in your computer without any malicious actions. 
Different combinations of these components perform Worm’s activities. Worms are designed with a large 
number of combinations to make it difficult to collect their pattern [8]. 
Finally, we can identify the following challenges for detecting and collecting worms’ payloads in cloud 
computing: 
• Polymorphic worms: the proposed approaches have to be able to collect a large number of payload 
instances for the same worm even if the worm uses polymorphism technique or checks its existence in the 
target machine before sending its code [15]. 
•  Customer privacy: the proposed approaches have to avoid violating the customers’ privacy, which can be 
violated by accessing the VM memory, VM disk image, or running VM processes. 
• Computational resources: the proposed approaches have to provide effective technique to detect and 
collect worms with minimal computational resources [16]. 
• Worms spreading: the proposed approaches have to avoid usage of tools that can be attacked by worms 
and accelerate worms spreading. 
• Out-box inspection: the proposed approaches have to use out-box inspection tools (e.g., virtual machine 
introspection (VMI), Virtual machine monitor (VMM), etc.) instead of using in-box inspection tools that 
inspect VM from inside to avoid detecting or attacking them by worms [4]. 
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• Homogeneous and heterogeneous platforms: cloud providers provide different platforms to gain a large 
number of customers. Customers customize the provided virtual servers by installing specific software to 
achieve their businesses requirements. The proposed approaches have to be able to detect and collect 
worms in a wide range of platforms, which is existed due to the big variation between customers’ 
requirements. Different platforms means different types of worms because worms’ writers usually write 
their worms based on specific vulnerabilities.  
• Cloud computing management techniques: The proposed approaches have to be able to work with 
different cloud computing management techniques such as VM migration. In cloud computing, VM 
migration is used to consolidate VMs to the minimal number of physical servers according to their current 
resource requirements [2]. The proposed approach has to inspect VMs even if their locations are 
dynamically changed. 
Scalability: Cloud computing datacenters are large-scale datacenters. The proposed approaches have to be 
scalable to work with such centers. 
III. RELATED WORK 
In recent years, we have observed a rapid growth of using VMI in intrusion detection instead of using the 
legacy tools. In traditional approaches [10], [14], [15], [17], inspection tools are installed and running inside 
VMs, which are vulnerable to attack from attackers and malware programs. Over the last years, many 
approaches have been proposed to inspect VM from outside to improve inspection and avoid attaching [3], [5], 
[11], [18]. In this section, we are going to overview some of previous approaches. 
The authors in [4] proposed an anomaly-based intrusion detection mechanism, which exploited virtual 
machine introspection (VMI) to collect a list of the running processes or modules of the running virtual 
machines. All collected information are gathered and analyzed by a centralized anomaly detector on a single 
virtual machine. Any unknown process or module that occurs on an increasing number of virtual machines is 
considered as a computer worm. The authors proposed a technique to collect information about unknown 
harmless processes. Although, using single point to gather information provides an abstract centralized view on 
entire cloud network, it congests network links because cloud network maybe contains hundreds of thousands of 
VMs. Furthermore, the proposed approach cannot detect computer worm that attached itself to trusted process. 
The authors in [21] proposed a distributed network of detection agents to coordinate detection across whole 
cloud network. Each agent is deployed in virtual machine monitor (VMM) of a physical cloud server. Using 
VMI, agents collect information of the running VMs on servers they are associated with. Agents monitor VM 
disk image, network activity, and state of VM memory. Agents share information to determine threats that 
crosscut physical servers. The proposed approach reduces the load on the network links by distributing the 
detection. However, monitoring all running VMs in the cloud data centers is a resources consuming process and 
increases the cost of cooling and operating these data centers, which will decrease the income profit.  
The authors in [8] identified a set of symptoms to indicate the possibility of malicious activities. For each 
symptom, a Forensic virtual machine (FVM) is defined to look for this symptom in running VMs. FVMs use 
VMI to inspect running VMs from outside. If a symptom is discovered in any VM, other FVMS are directed to 
inspect this VM for other symptoms. Collected information is sent to a centralized module to analyze them and 
take further actions. 
In [19], the authors proposed high-interaction honeypot monitor, which inspects memory of the running 
virtual machine on Xen by using the open source forensics tool Volatility. Volatility accesses the VM’s memory 
by using interface functions provided by LibVMI API. LibVMI provides interfaces for low-level functionalities 
provided by Xen hypervisor. Changed binaries in the inspected VM have been extracted by using Libguestfs, 
which is an open source library to analyze and manipulate file system. Although the proposed approach 
succeeded in capturing a wide range of malware including normal worms, it did not provide a technique to 
collect polymorphic worms. 
In [14], the authors proposed a high-interaction double honeynet to collect polymorphic worms and proposed 
algorithms to generate signatures for the collected worms. However, the authors used in-box introspection tools 
(tools installed in inspected VMs) such as Honeywall, Sebek, and Snort-inline, which are susceptible to be 
detected or attacked by worms. Furthermore, the proposed approach cannot collect polymorphic worms that 
check their existence in the target host before sending their code because the proposed double honeynet works 
by forming a loop to collect all polymorphic worm instances. 
In [16], the authors started by using VMI to detect incoming files and objects, and trigger file clustering 
module, which classifies incoming files and monitors their execution. Two algorithms have been proposed to 
detect malicious activities for incoming files and objects. Using VMI, data and information flow of malicious 
processes have been recorded instead of recording all data or information flow of all processes to simplify the 
analysis task. However, the proposed approach inspects all incoming files and object, and monitors their 
execution to detect malicious activities, which consumes many computer resources. 
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As was shown previously, most of current approaches either inspect VMs from inside, inspect all running 
VMs, inspect all running processes and modules, or cannot collect polymorphic worm instances. In the next 
section, we will introduce our approach to collect polymorphic worms. 
IV. THE PROPOSED APPROACH DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 
The aim of the proposed approach is detecting and collecting payloads of zero-day active polymorphic worms 
in homogeneous and heterogeneous cloud computing platforms without violating the customer privacy. 
In the proposed approach, worms’ spreading is limited by isolating traffic of each virtual network from the 
traffic of other networks by using virtual switches in XenServer [6] or in VMware vCenter Server [20]. For 
example, Fig. 1 shows the isolation between two virtual networks using virtual distributed switches in 
VMware vCenter Server. Each virtual network contains two virtual servers, which belong to the same distributed 
port group. A distributed virtual switch has been created with one distributed port group for each virtual network. 
Virtual servers are located in ESXi hosts. Although, VM1 and VM3 are located at the same physical server and 
there traffics are transmitted across the same underlying NIC, they cannot sniff or inject traffic into each other 
because each of them belongs to different distributed port group and different distributed switch. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 Isolation between virtual networks 
Fig. 2 shows the proposed approach architecture to detect and collect polymorphic worms in such networks. 
Introspection controller creates virtual machine inspectors from virtual machine inspectors’ templates. 
Introspection controller assigns a set of virtual networks to each VM inspector. Introspection controller 
identifies current virtual networks by retrieving a list of virtual distributed switch from vCenter server database.  
 
 
Fig. 2 The proposed approach architecture 
VM inspector creates honeypot VMs from honeypot templates, which are VM templates. Each honeypot 
template contains a subset of software from the most common software deployed in cloud computing network. 
This partitioning minimizes the size of honeypots and allows each honeypot to capture a specific type of worms 
that are related to this subset of software. VM inspector connects each honeypot with one virtual network by 
adding honeypot to the port group of that virtual network (see Fig. 3). VM inspector creates and connects 
honeypots sequentially to avoid consuming a large number of computer resources.  
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If the virtual network is infected by active worms, the worms will discover the honeypot and contaminate it. 
After a considerable amount of time, VM inspector disconnects honeypot from the virtual network and connects 
it with another instance of honeypot, which is created from the same honeypot template (see Fig. 4). These two 
honeypots form a double honeynet. This technique reduces false positive and false negative because only active 
worms can discover and infect the new honeypot. 
Honeypot template is designed to snapshot the running VM periodically and automatically. VM inspector 
analyzes the memory snapshots of the running honeypots using Volatility [22], which is one of the famous 
forensic tools. Using Volatility, VM inspector can gain a lot of information regarding the running VMs. For 
example, VM inspector can list the running processes, the previously terminated processes, hidden or unlinked 
processes, and the loaded DLLs for the running processes. All these lists are saved in a separated text file and 
used as input to the Checker component. The Checker compares these lists with previously saved lists collected 
from normal running to detect anomaly processes or modules. 
 
 
Fig. 3 Honeypot1 was created and connected with virtual network 
 
 
 
Fig. 4 Honeypot2 was created and connected with Honeypot1 
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Honeypot VM template is designed with independent and non-persistent hard disk. This feature in Vmware 
allows running VM to save any modified blocks to a separated log file (.REDO files). VM inspector uses Virtual 
Disk API, or VixDiskLib functions (such as QueryChangedDiskAreas) with log and VMDK files to retrieve the 
list of disk sectors that have been changed and to retrieve the list of files that have been modified, created, added, 
or deleted.  
Using snapshots, VM inspector restores honeypots disk data and virtual machine state to the original data and 
state in rotate way. This restoration allows worms running in honeypots to re-contaminate honepots again if they 
check their existence in the target machine before sending their code. VM inspector stores all collected data in 
the introspection database to be used in the future by signature generators. After a considerable number of 
iterations, VM inspector stops the loop, destroys honeypots, and creates another honeypot to inspect the next 
virtual network.  
V. EVALUATION 
Now, we return to the previously listed challenges in section 2 to show that the proposed approach overcome 
these challenges. 
• Polymorphic worms: the proposed approach collects polymorphic worms payload using double honeynet , 
and periodically restores honeypots to the original state (before contamination) to collect worms that 
check if they are running in the target machine before sending their code.    
•  Customer privacy: to avoid violating the customers’ privacy, the proposed approach does not inspect the 
customers’ VMs directly. The proposed approach uses honeypots to allow existing worms (if any) to 
infect them and inspect the infected honeypots instead of inspecting the customers’ VMs. 
• Worms spreading: honeypots are created from clean VMs’ templates and each honeypot is connected with 
only one virtual network to avoid transferring worms between virtual networks. All inspection tools are 
running outside the inspected honeypots (in hypervisor layer). Therefore, worms cannot detect or 
contaminate them. 
• Out-box inspection: in the proposed approach, VMs inspectors inspect honeypots from the outside by 
inspecting snapshots. Therefore, worms cannot manipulate or detect them. 
• Homogeneous and heterogeneous platforms: the proposed approach uses different VMs’ template for 
honeypots to achieve variations between virtual networks. Each VM template is designed to capture a 
category of worms that are designed to use vulnerabilities in its software. 
• Cloud computing management techniques: in the proposed approach, VMs inspectors connect honeypots 
with virtual networks by adding them to the port groups in virtual distributed switches, which allows 
honeypots to keep on connected with virtual networks even if they are migrated between hosts. 
• Scalability: introspection controller creates and destroys VM inspectors based on the number of the 
running virtual networks to follow the growing and the shrinking of the cloud computing datacenters. 
• Computational resources: the proposed approach does not inspect all running virtual machines. Each VM 
inspector uses one honeypot for each virtual network and inspects virtual networks sequentially to 
minimize computer resources used during inspection process. To accelerate the introspection, all created 
VM inspectors running concurrently. The proposed approach reduced the time required to analyze file 
system by analyzing log and REDO files that contain only modified sectors instead of analyzing whole 
VM disk image. For Example, in our implementation, we created four honypot VM templates with the 
specifications shown in table 1. Fig. 5 shows the size of REDO (log) files created during running VMs 
from these templates. As shown in Fig. 5, the size of REDO file is not comparable with the size of the 
VM disk image and we can reduce its size by reducing the connection time before restoring the original 
data. For example, in honypot VM template for Windows Xp professional, we analyze the log files 
(around 40 megabyte) instead of analyzing VM disk image with 5 GB.  
TABLE I 
TEMPLATES’ SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE CREATED HONEYPOT VMS 
Operating System RAM Hard Disk processors 
Windows Xp professional 512 MB 5 GB 1 
Windows server 2003 Enterprise Edition 1GB 20 GB 1 
Red hat Linux 1GB 30 GB 1 
Windows server 2008 1GB 30 GB 1 
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Fig. 5 The size of log files that are created by the running VMs 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have identified challenges facing current approaches during collecting polymorphic 
computer worms in cloud computing. A high-interactive double honeypot has been proposed to address the 
identified challenges. The proposed approach inspects VMs from outside to detect hidden processes and to 
avoid detection by worms. Customers’ privacy has been conserved by avoiding directly inspecting their VMs. 
Used computer resources have been reduced by inspecting cloud datacenters by virtual network instead of by 
VM. The proposed approach keeps tracking VMs even if there locations are changed over time. 
In our future work, we plan to investigate how to reduce the time of inspecting VM memory and how to 
reduce the number of honeypots required to inspect virtual networks. Furthermore, we plan to extend our 
approach to inspect network traffic beside memory and file system.  
REFERENCES 
[1] V. Abedifar, M. Eshghi, S. Mirjalili, and S. Mirjalili, “An optimized virtual network mapping using PSO 
in cloud computing,” in 2013 21st Iranian Conference on Electrical Engineering (ICEE), May 2013, pp. 
1–6. 
[2] A. Beloglazov and R. Buyya, “Energy efficient resource management in virtualized cloud data centers,” in 
2010 10th IEEE/ACM International Conference on Cluster, Cloud and Grid Computing (CCGrid), May 
2010, pp. 826–831. 
[3] C. Benninger, S. Neville, Y. Yazir, C. Matthews, and Y. Coady, “Maitland: Lighter-weight VM 
introspection to support cyber-security in the cloud,” in 2012 IEEE 5th International Conference on Cloud 
Computing (CLOUD), June 2012, pp. 471–478. 
[4] S. Biedermann and S. Katzenbeisser, Detecting computer worms in the cloud: Open Problems in Network 
Security, ser. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2012, vol. 7039, pp. 43–54.  
[5] H. H. X. F. Z. J. Chen Lin, Liu Bo, “Detecting hidden malware method based on in-VM model,” China 
Communications, vol. 8, no. 4, p. 99, 2011.  
[6] Citrix, Citrix XenServer Design: Designing XenServer Network Configurations, C. Systems, Ed. Citrix 
Systems, 2011. [Online]. Available: http://support.citrix.com/servlet/KbServlet/download/27046-102-
666250/XS-design-network_advanced.pdf  
[7] P. Comar, L. Liu, S. Saha, P.-N. Tan, and A. Nucci, “Combining supervised and unsupervised learning for 
zero-day malware detection,” in INFOCOM, 2013 Proceedings IEEE, April 2013, pp. 2022–2030. 
[8] K. Harrison, B. Bordbar, S. Ali, C. Dalton, and A. Norman, “A framework for detecting malware in cloud 
by identifying symptoms,” in 2012 IEEE 16th International Enterprise Distributed Object Computing 
Conference (EDOC), Sept 2012, pp. 164–172. 
[9] M. Hirwani, “Forensic analysis of vmware hard disks,” Master’s thesis, Rochester Institute of Technology, 
New York, 2011. 
[10] S. F. W. Jedidiah R. Crandall, Zhendong Su and F. T. Chong, “On deriving unknown vulnerabilities from 
zero day polymorphic and metamorphic worm exploits,” in the 12th ACM Conference on Computer and 
Communications Security, 2005. 
[11] M. Laureano, C. Maziero, and E. Jamhour, “Intrusion detection in virtual machine environments,” in 30th 
Euromicro Conference, Aug 2004, pp. 520–525. 
[12] B. S. D. J. Manish Hirwani, Yin Pan, “Forensic acquisition and analysis of vmware virtual hard disks,” in 
The 2012 International Conference on Security and Management (SAM’12), Las Vegas, USA, July 2012. 
8 
[13] V. Meera, M. Isaac, and C. Balan, “Forensic acquisition and analysis of vmware virtual machine artifacts,” 
in 2013 International Multi-Conference on Automation, Computing, Communication, Control and 
Compressed Sensing (iMac4s), March 2013, pp. 255–259. 
[14] M. Mohammed and A.-S. K. Pathan, Automatic Defense Against Zero-day Polymorphic Worms in 
Communication Networks. Taylor & Francis Group, LLC, 2013. 
[15] M. M. Z. E. Mohammed, “Automated signature generation for zero-day polymorphic worms using a 
double-honeynet,” Ph.D. dissertation, Faculty of Engineering and The Built Environment, University of 
Cape Town, 2012. 
[16] A. More and S. Tapaswi, “Dynamic malware detection and recording using virtual machine introspection,” 
in Best Practices Meet (BPM), 2013 DSCI, July 2013, pp. 1–6. 
[17] M. Schmidt, L. Baumgartner, P. Graubner, D. Bock, and B. Freisleben, “Malware detection and kernel 
rootkit prevention in cloud computing environments,” in 19th Euromicro International Conference on 
Parallel, Distributed and Network-Based Processing (PDP), Feb 2011, pp. 603–610. 
[18] H. Sharma and N. Sabharwal, “Investigating the implications of virtual forensics,” in 2012 International 
Conference on Advances in Engineering, Science and Management (ICAESM), March 2012, pp. 617–620. 
[19] J. N. Tamas K. Lengyel and S. Maresca, “Virtual machine introspection in a hybrid honeypot 
architecture,” in Presented as part of the 5th Workshop on Cyber Security Experimentation and Test. 
Berkeley, CA: USENIX, 2012.  
[20] VMWare, vSphere Networking, 2014. [Online]. Available: http://www.vmware.com/support/  
[21] M. R. Watson, “Malware detection in the context of cloud computing,” in The 13th Annual Postgraduate 
Symposium on The Convergence of Telecommunications, Networking, and Broadcasting.., 2012. 
[22] The Volatility Framework, Google Project Hosting, 2013. [Online]. Available: 
https://volatility.googlecode.com/files/CheatSheet_v2.3.pdf 
